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Abstract The comply-or-explain principle is a central element of most codes of
corporate governance. Originally put forward by the Cadbury Committee in the UK
as a practical means of establishing a code of corporate governance whilst avoiding
an inflexible ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach, it has since been incorporated into code
regimes around the world. Companies can either comply with code provisions or
may explain why they do not comply, i.e., why they deviate from a code provision.
Despite its wide application very little is known about the ways in which comply-or-
explain is used. In addressing this we employ legitimacy theory by which expla-
nations for deviating can be understood as means of legitimizing the company’s
actions. We analyzed the compliance statements and reports of 257 listed companies
in the UK and Germany, producing some 715 records of deviation. From this we
generated an empirically derived taxonomy of the explanations. In a second order
analysis we examine the underlying logic and identify various legitimacy tactics.
We discuss the consequences of these legitimacy tactics for code regimes and the
implications for policy makers.
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1 Introduction
Many countries have instated codes of corporate governance over the past two
decades (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004; Van den Berghe and DeRidder 1999;
Iskander and Chamlou 2000; Weil et al. 2002; Haxhi and Van Ees 2010). Since
1992, when the first comprehensive code of corporate governance was published by
the Cadbury Committee in the UK, more than eighty countries have introduced such
codes (see http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes). These codes are sets of non-
binding rules pertaining to the internal governance of—typically listed—companies,
which are issued by a collective body such as a stock exchange, government
commission, shareholder or other interest group (Weil et al. 2003).
A central element of most codes is the ‘‘comply-or-explain’’ principle, which was
first put forward in the Cadbury Report as a practical means of establishing a single
code of corporate governance whilst avoiding an inflexible ‘‘one size fits all’’
approach. Cadbury (1992) required that, ‘‘[L]isted companies… should state in the
report and accounts whether they comply with the Code and identify and give
reasons for any areas of non-compliance.’’ This approach received support from The
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002) which compared and evaluated
different code regimes throughout Europe and has since been advocated by the
Commission for use by member states (Communication of the Commission 2003;
European Corporate Governance Forum 2006; see also RiskMetrics Group 2009).
Theoretically, the comply-or-explain mechanism provides both flexibility in the
application of the code and a means by which to assess compliance: ‘‘While it is
expected that listed companies will comply with the Code’s provisions most of the
time, it is recognized that departure from the provisions of the code may be justified
in particular circumstances. Every company must review each provision carefully
and give a considered explanation if it departs from the Code provisions’’ (Financial
Reporting Council 2006a, b: 5).
Despite its promotion by various national and supranational organizations, very
little scholarly research has been carried out on how the comply-or-explain
mechanism functions in practice (see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009). There
have been numerous surveys on compliance rates (e.g. Von Werder et al. 2005; Von
Werder and Talaulicar 2006, 2010; Akkermans et al. 2007) and correlations made
between compliance rates and firm performance, size or share prices (e.g. Gompers
et al. 2003; Bauer et al. 2004; Goncharov et al. 2006; Drobetz et al. 2004;
Ferna´ndez-Rodrı´guez et al. 2004; Alves and Mendes 2004; Andres and Theissen
2008), but hardly any systematic research has been conducted on the different ways
in which companies make use of the option to ‘‘explain’’. The limited extent to
which comply-or-explain has been researched has not gone unremarked. In a
statement endorsing the principle the European Corporate Governance Forum
(2006; similarly Von Werder and Talaulicar 2010: 861) stated:
[I]t seems appropriate to have a closer look at the way in which companies
comply with the recommendations of the applicable code. In particular, it does
not seem sufficient to rely on simple compliance rates. When applying the
principle of ‘Comply-or explain’ more emphasis needs to be put on the quality
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of the explanations for deviations from the code as a meaningful explanation
can fully justify non-compliance. The potential responsibility inherent to a
statement of compliance should also be examined.
To date, only five studies have attempted in a rather general way to address
questions relating to the use of comply-or-explain and the overall quality of the
explanations: The first is a paper by MacNeil and Li (2006) which provides a
cursory review of the contents of compliance statements concluding they were not
suitable vehicles for the provision of reasoned explanations. However, their
conclusion is questionable as monitors clearly find acceptable many of the
explanations provided, as Akkermans et al. (2007) and Arcot et al. (2010) find.
While the latter two do examine explanation quality they do not attempt to delineate
and classify the explanations. The European Commission too has covered the same
ground in a pan-European study (RiskMetrics Group 2009). Here again the analysis
lacks depth. Categorisation is fairly basic. Explanations are delineated as ‘‘invalid,’’
‘‘general,’’ ‘‘limited,’’ ‘‘specific,’’ or ‘‘transitional’’ (p. 169). Perhaps the best
attempt so far to categorise explanations has been by Hooghiemstra and van Ees
(2011) who, drawing in part on Seidl et al. (2009), used nine separate categories in
the content analysis element of their examination of firms’ trade-offs between
flexibility and uncertainty in the use of comply-or-explain. These studies provide a
starting point but given the wide diffusion of governance codes and the centrality of
the comply-or-explain principle within them, there appears to be a particular need
for a more detailed, nuanced, exploration of the way in which the principle is put
into practice, not least to assist policymakers to determine the conditions under
which such flexible forms of regulation are likely to be most effective—or indeed,
ineffective.
Effectiveness of course requires evaluation. Monitors, particularly in the form of
institutional investors or other influential shareholders, determine the quality of the
explanation given, and in so doing, can be said to confer legitimacy on the
explanation and the underlying action and, hence, on the organization as a whole.
Indeed, legitimacy theory (arising from organisational institutionalism and resource
dependency theory—see Suchman 1995; Deephouse and Suchman 2008) appears to
lend itself particularly well as a theoretical perspective for studying the practical use
of the comply-or-explain principle as it addresses the relational aspect between
organizations and their external audiences. According to legitimacy theory,
organizations are generally expected to provide explanations for behaviours that
deviate from institutionalised expectations in order to preserve their legitimacy in
the eyes of their external audiences. These external audiences observe the
organizational activities and structures and accordingly make legitimacy assess-
ments (Ruef and Scott 1998: 880). This resonates well with the idea of ‘‘comply or
explain’’.
Two aspects of the ‘‘comply-or-explain’’ principle appear particularly interesting
from the perspective of legitimacy theory. First, in contrast to other institutions
examined in prior studies (e.g. ISO 9000), comply-or-explain based codes explicitly
acknowledge that deviation is legitimate—if justified and such justifications are
generally accepted. In other words, we are dealing here with an institution (the
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provisions of the code) and a meta-institution (the comply-or-explain principle) that
together confer legitimacy on what would otherwise be considered illegitimate—
noncompliance with rules. Hence, noncompliance can be compliant. Second, these
codes put particular emphasis on discursive forms of legitimacy rather than simple
compliance. Both compliance with the code and the justifications for deviation are
assessed. External audiences read and evaluate company statements on corporate
governance. This discursive dimension of legitimacy has been variously stressed in
the institutional literature (e.g. Vaara et al. 2006; Phillips et al. 2004; Lounsbury and
Glynn 2001).
In this paper we will examine the way in which companies apply the comply-or-
explain principle. We posed two exploratory research questions:
(1) To what extent and in what way do companies make use of the ‘‘explain’’
option, i.e., the possibility to deviate from code provisions by stating their
reasons for doing so?
(2) What kind of legitimacy tactics can be identified in the ‘‘explanations’’
provided?
To address these questions we analysed the compliance statements and reports of
257 listed companies, producing some 715 records of deviations and respective
‘‘explanations’’. In order to reduce the risk of bias in terms of context specificity, our
sample included companies from two different countries (UK and Germany) with
contrasting legal cultures, capital market structures and experiences of regulatory
codes (La Porta et al. 1998, 2000; Licht et al. 2005; Haxhi 2010).
From the analysis of our data we derived an empirically grounded taxonomy
of different forms of ‘‘explanation’’ for deviations which also illustrates the
extent of the variety of ways in which the ‘‘explain’’ option is used by
companies. In contrast to the original idea of ‘‘comply or explain’’, which
emphasised the possibility of justifying deviations with situation-specific reasons
(e.g., company size or company structure), a significant number of the deviations
analysed were either not justified at all (e.g., deviations are simply disclosed but
not justified) or were justified on the basis of principled objections (e.g.,
inappropriateness of code provisions especially where both companies and
monitors consider a provision fails to embody best practice). In a second order
analysis we identified different legitimacy tactics underlying the different forms
of ‘‘explanation’’ and the associated consequences for governance codes as
institutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured in five sections. First, the concept of the
‘‘comply-or-explain’’ principle is explained in more detail and legitimacy theory is
introduced as our particular theoretical perspective. Second, the empirical research
design and analytical process is explained. Then, we present the empirical findings
in two sections: (1) providing a descriptive account of the different ways in which
companies make use of the ‘‘explain’’ option and (2) providing an analysis of the
different legitimacy tactics that the identified form of compliance statements
represent. Finally, we discuss the results and their contributions to the exiting
literatures.
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2 Theoretical background
From the perspective of legitimacy theory, established governance codes constitute
institutionalized expectations regarding the actions or structures of organizations.
Companies typically respond to governance codes in order to sustain their legitimacy
(Enrione et al. 2006: 968; Hooghiemstra and van Ees 2011); that is to say, to sustain the
‘‘generalized perception or assumption that [their] actions […] are desirable, proper,
or appropriate’’ (Suchman 1995: 574). In turn, the legitimacy of codes of governance
themselves derives in part from the fact that they embody what is generally considered
‘‘best practice’’—practices that may be expected to have a positive impact on the
management of the company. Of course these practices may be little more than beliefs
about, for example, the correlation of good governance with good performance, the
evidence for which is debatable—investigators seems to divide fairly equally between
those who find the relationship positive and those who do not, much depending on the
variables selected and the means by which endogeneity is controlled (Renders et al.
2010; Bianchi et al. 2011). In this sense, governance codes can be seen as constituting
‘‘myths of rationality’’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977), to which companies respond for
reasons of legitimacy rather than mere efficiency.
At the centre of legitimacy theory is the relationship between the organization and
its audiences. It is not the structures or actions of a company per se which grant it
legitimacy but rather the particular relationship with its audience (Suchman 1995:
594). That is to say, every company will try to ensure that its audiences perceive its
actions and structures as desirable, proper or appropriate. Apart from conformance to
institutionalized expectations, whether authentic or inauthentic, companies employ a
variety of ‘‘strategies’’ or ‘‘tactics’’ to preserve legitimacy (Suchman 1995) such as
‘‘promising reform’’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977) or engaging in dialogue with the
relevant audiences in order to convince them about the desirability or moral
superiority of an alternative course of action (Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995; Deephouse
and Suchman 2008). These legitimacy tactics are essentially discursive (cf. Vaara et al.
2006; Phillips et al. 2004; Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Elsbach 1994). Legitimacy
management, as Suchman stresses, ‘‘rests heavily on communication—in this case,
communication between the organization and its various audiences’’ (Suchman 1995:
586). This can be seen in the language employed in the UK and German code
documents which speak of ‘‘general expectations’’, ‘‘justifications’’, ‘‘considered
explanations’’ etc. (see Weil et al. 2002, 2003; Seidl 2007).
Companies that do not provide convincing ‘‘explanations’’ for non-compliance
are expected to face an ‘‘illegitimacy discount’’ (Zuckerman 1999) from the capital
markets. It is up to the key audience, in this case primarily investors, ‘‘to make an
informed assessment of whether non-compliance is justified in the particular
circumstances’’ (MacNeil and Li 2006: 499), and thus whether an illegitimacy
discount should be applied (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996; Weil et al. 2002: 68–69).
As Schu¨ppen writes: ‘The influence of compliance on the share price is the idea
behind the [comply-or-explain rule]’ (Schu¨ppen 2002: 1273; our translation). Even
if the capital markets are content, adverse comment in the media on a company’s
compliance position may impact negatively on the company (Seidl 2007; Dyck and
Zingles 2002). While this may be simplistic, many (but not all) companies do report
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considerable pressure to provide convincing justifications for any deviations (see
Sanderson et al. 2010).
Particularly interesting from a legitimacy perspective is the inherent flexibility of
comply-or-explain based codes. The code provisions are explicitly meant to be applied
flexibly. Companies are not expected to follow all provisions on a one size fits all basis.
Rather, where individual rules are not appropriate for a particular organizational
setting, companies are expected, even actively encouraged, to deviate. This
expectation is made explicit in the preamble to the codes. The Combined Code, for
example, states clearly that: ‘Whilst shareholders have every right to challenge
companies’ explanations if they are unconvincing, they should not be evaluated in a
mechanistic way and departures from the Code should not be automatically treated as
breaches’ (Financial Reporting Council 2006a, b: 7). The official commentary on the
German Cromme Code states: ‘Flexibility, as [one of the] guiding idea[s] of the code,
is meant to prevent companies affected by the code from being corseted into too
inflexible regulations. Companies should rather have the possibility of tailoring the
modalities of corporate governance to their individual situations and of optimizing
them with regard to efficiency criteria’ (Ringleb et al. 2004: 89; our translation). It is
thus acknowledged that ‘‘in particular circumstances’’ (Financial Reporting Council
2006a, b: 5) deviation from code provisions is legitimate. Indeed, policy makers
employing comply-or-explain are well aware from the outset that some companies
will have difficulties in complying with certain provisions. The Cadbury Committee,
for example, recognized that ‘‘smaller listed companies may initially have difficulty in
complying with some aspects of the code. […] The boards of smaller listed companies
who cannot, for the time being, comply with parts of the Code should note that they
may instead give their reasons for non-compliance’’ (Cadbury 1992: 3.15). Hence,
rather than forcing corporations into governance solutions that do not fit their
particular circumstances, either because they are ‘‘technically’’ not feasible or because
the costs incurred by these solutions are disproportionate to the benefits, companies
can deviate from individual code provisions—as long as they clearly state their
reasons. It is the essential genius of comply-or-explain that companies can be said to be
in conformance with the code even when deviating from it. Non-compliance can be
(but is not necessarily) compliant.
In term of legitimacy theory, the comply-or-explain principle can be understood
as providing a means of legitimating deviations from individual code provisions. In
contrast to most other institutions corporate governance codes acknowledge from
the outset that deviations can be as legitimate as compliance with the code
provisions. In other words, the institution—in the form of the comply-or-explain
principle—reflexively regulates the deviations from itself. In that sense, we can also
speak of the comply-or-explain principle as a meta-institution; i.e., an institution
that regulates when and how deviations from the primary institution (in this case the
code provisions) can be seen as legitimate. While in other cases organizations would
engage discursively in explanations and justifications particularly when deviating
from an institution, here explanation and justification of deviations is part of the
institution itself (i.e., the formal comply-or-explain principle). This is an important
aspect of great theoretical interest that deserves further empirical investigation,
which is the main focus of this study.
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3 Methodological approach
3.1 Data collection
To study the discursive legitimacy tactics employed by companies in respect of their
relevant code of corporate governance, we analysed their annual compliance
statements and governance reports—the documents in which they are expected to
declare compliance and justify deviations. Our choice of data was guided by three
considerations: Firstly, our focus on legitimacy means we are more concerned with
the extent of compliance and quality of any ‘explanation’ given than most existing
studies where the primary focus tends to be on compliance rates (e.g. Von Werder
et al. 2005); Secondly, since attitudes towards compliance with code provisions
have been shown to vary with relative company size due to differences in capital
market attention and media coverage (Akkermans et al. 2007: 1109), we include
companies from different size ranges. In line with earlier studies (e.g. Akkermans
et al. 2007; Von Werder et al. 2005), we include companies from different stock
market indices ranging from the largest, the German DAX30, through the mid-size
companies that comprise the MDAX, to the smaller companies in the SDAX;
Finally, in order to reduce the risk of bias due to country specificities we include
also companies with the same rankings on the London Stock Exchange. The UK has
of course a contrasting legal culture, capital market structure and a different
tradition and experience of regulatory codes (La Porta et al. 1998; Haxhi 2010) so
we would expect therefore to capture a reasonably broad range of explanations.
The UK ‘Combined Code’ and German ‘Cromme Code’ are fairly similar in
terms of their format and content (Akkermans et al. 2007: 1107). The most
noticeable difference is in number of code provisions. For the year analysed the
Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2006a, b) contains 48 code
provisions while the Cromme Code (Cromme Commission 2005) has 82. This is
because the rules are aggregated to a greater extent in the UK—hence we generally
use percentages rather than absolute numbers. The treatment of comply-or-explain
differs slightly also. In the UK the obligation to comply or explain is part of the
listing requirements while in Germany it is integrated into statutory law (§ 161
Stock Corporation Act) as an obligation to ‘‘disclose’’ any deviations and,
additionally, integrated into the Cromme Code as a ‘‘recommendation’’ to provide
explanations for any deviations disclosed (Cromme Code: 3.10)—subsequent to the
study the respective law was changed to include the obligation to provide
explanations. Despite this formal difference, in both countries there is a strong
expectation that deviations are explained (Ringleb et al. 2004).
Our combined data comprises the compliance statements therefore of 260
companies—the largest 130 from each stock exchange. The statements we analyse
are those published in the calendar year 2006, reporting their activities to years
ending 31 December 2005, 31 March 2006 or 31 December 2006.1 In Germany this
1 There were minor changes made to the UK Combined Code published in June 2006 for use in reporting
years commencing after 01 November 2006. However, depending on their reporting period, some British
companies used the 2003 version, some, particularly those that conformed fully (without deviation), used
the 2006 version in anticipation, some used one but referred in explanation to the other. For consistency
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includes all companies contained in the Dax30 (30 companies with a market
capitalization between €4 bn and €80 bn), the MDax (50 companies with a market
capitalization between €0.3 bn and €7 bn) and the SDax (50 companies with a
market capitalization of €0.05 bn and €0.5 bn). In the UK this includes all FTSE100
companies and the next largest 30 companies of the FTSE250—with a market
capitalization ranging from £2 bn to £112 bn (€3 bn—€165 bn). From this initial set
of 260 companies three were excluded (one from the UK and two from Germany) as
they were not required to submit statements of compliance—either under the
relevant listing rules or because of their legal status during the period in question.
This leaves 257 companies and their respective compliance statements and
corresponding corporate governance reports.2 The companies in both our chosen
countries cover all the core economic sectors. The combined number of deviations
recorded is 715. See Table 1 for a summary of the data set.
3.2 Data analysis
To answer our research questions on the extent to which companies make use of the
explain option, and what legitimacy tactics they are using in their explanations, we
first identified in the compliance statement and company report of each of the 257
companies those passages referring to individual code provisions. This resulted in a
set of 715 stated deviations. Then content analysis of the selected passages was
Table 1 Summary of data set
Index Size band Number of compliance
statements available
Total number
of deviations
Germany
DAX 30 Band A (30 companies) 30 79
MDAX Band B (50 companies) 49 210
SDAX Band C (50 companies) 49 282
UK
FTSE 1–30 Band A (30 companies) 30 19
FTSE 31–80 Band B (50 companies) 49 47
FTSE 81–130 Band C (50 companies) 50 72
Total 260 257 715
Footnote 1 continued
we illustrate the latest 2006 version but in our analysis employed whichever version the reporting
company used. It is after all the explanation and use of comply-or-explain with which we are concerned
here—not the specific rules themselves. But in fact most changes were minor in the sense that they
slightly amended existing provisions rather than making wholesale deletions and insertions, e.g., the
restriction on the company Chairman serving on the remuneration committee was removed to enable him
or her to do so where considered independent on appointment as Chairman (although it is still recom-
mended that he or she should not also chair the committee).
2 Note that in Germany some companies provide the explanations for their deviations in the so-called
Corporate Governance Report’’ rather than the ‘‘Compliance Statement’’ (Entsprechenserkla¨rung) as
such. When we talk about ‘‘compliance statement’’ here we refer to any section in the company report that
provides information on compliance.
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carried out (Babbie 2003; Krippendorf 2004; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss
and Corbin 1998; Weber 1990). The coding of the passages involved several
iterative steps. Initially, two of the authors of this paper analysed fifty passages
independently of each other. This exercise resulted in two sets of preliminary
categories of ‘‘explanations’’ for deviations. These sets were then compared and the
differences considered leading to an initial common set of categories. Using these
common categories, a further one hundred passages were analysed independently by
the authors. Again, the results were compared and reconciled, which led to the
addition of some further categories. At this point it emerged that there was overlap
between some of the initial categories so some more general categories were
introduced. The resulting set was then organized into main and sub-categories.
Based on this set of categories we analysed the remaining passages independently of
each other. The discussion of the results of this analysis confirmed that the
categories we identified were orthogonal and mutually exclusive (Strauss and
Corbin 1998). In this way we generated an empirically derived taxonomy of forms
of ‘‘explanation’’ for deviations. Finally, in order to ensure inter-coder reliability an
independent researcher recoded all the records again and the few discrepancies
found were addressed. We then examined the distribution of the different types of
declaration of levels of compliance (based on our empirically generated taxonomy)
across the different companies, countries and company sizes. This was done in order
to assess whether any types of explanations were particular to a specific context. In
order to facilitate this analysis we divided the set of companies into similar bands:
the German data set was divided along the three main indices—DAX, MDAX and
SDAX; the British data was divided into analogous bands—the thirty largest
companies, the next fifty largest companies and the fifty smallest companies in the
set. Finally, in a second order analysis we analyzed the identified types of
explanations to determine the different legitimacy tactics that they represented. The
result of this analysis is presented in the second part of this paper.
4 Analysis and findings
4.1 Flexibility granted through the comply-or-explain principle
Examination of the corporate governance reports and compliance statements in our
sample shows that companies make considerable use of the flexibility provided by
the comply-or-explain principle. While about half of all the British companies
declare deviations from some of the code provisions, in Germany this rises to five
Table 2 Number of deviating
companies
Companies (size) UK (%) Germany (%)
Band A (1–30) 33.3 60.0
Band B (31–80) 38.8 89.2
Band C (81–130) 65.0 98.0
Total 48.0 85.9
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out of six (see Table 2). In both the UK and Germany there is a strong correlation
between number of deviations and size, with smaller companies recording
considerably more. The maximum number of deviations recorded by any one
company is 14.6% of all code provisions in the UK and 36.6% in Germany. The
average number of deviations by non-compliers is 4.7% in the UK and 6.3% in
Germany (see Table 3). Again, the number of deviations tends to be inversely
related to company size. These findings are consistent with earlier studies of
compliance rates in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands (Hooghiemstra and van
Ees 2011; MacNeil and Li 2006; RiskMetrics Group 2009; Von Werder et al. 2005;
Von Werder and Talaulicar 2006).
Although the absolute number of deviations varies considerably between the two
countries, and between size bands within the countries, the sheer number of deviations
recorded would seem to suggest that concerns about companies being driven towards
full compliance are largely unfounded. It had been argued (see Wymeersch 2005: 418;
Seidl 2007) pressure to be classified as fully compliant could force companies into
inappropriate or sub-optimal decisions. Even though we cannot rule this out
completely almost 60% of firms examined from the UK and almost 80% from
Germany deviated from at least one code provision (see Table 4). That is to say, the
majority of code provisions are treated as flexible regulations. They are also the code
provisions that generate most controversy (Von Werder et al. 2005; MacNeil and Li
2006). The most frequent deviations in the UK concerned (in the order of frequency):
A.3.2. the requirement for a majority of the board to be independent non-
executive directors;
C.3.1. the composition of the audit committee
B.2.1. the composition of the remuneration committee, and;
A 4.1. the requirement for the majority of members of the nomination committee
to be independent.
Table 3 Number of deviations per company
Companies (size) Average number of deviations
by non-compliers
Maximum number of deviations
by company
UK (%) Germany (%) UK (%) Germany (%)
Band A (1–30) 3.8 5.4 8.3 24.4
Band B (31–80) 5.2 5.8 12.5 36.6
Band C (81–130) 4.6 7.2 14.6 18.3
Total 4.7 6.3 14.6 36.6
Table 4 Number of code
provisions that are not
universally applied
Companies (size) UK (%) Germany (%)
Band A (1–30) 25.0 37.8
Band B (31–80) 35.4 57.3
Band C (81–130) 43.8 56.1
Total 58.3 78.1
800 D. Seidl et al.
123
In Germany the provision with the highest level of deviation was:
4.2.4S2. requiring the individualized disclosure of the compensation of the
Management Board Members, followed by;
3.8. agreeing a suitable deductible for the D&O insurance policy, and;
5.4.7Para3S1. requiring the individual disclosure of the compensation of the
Supervisory Board Members
Table 5 presents an overview of the code provisions with the highest number of
deviations from both countries.
Table 5 Code provisions with the highest number of deviations
UK Germany
A.2.1 The roles of chairman and chief executive
should not be exercised by the same individual.
The division of responsibilities between the
chairman and chief executive should be clear ….
3.8 If the company takes out a D&O policy for [its]
Board[s], a suitable deductible shall be agreed.
A.2.2 The chairman should on appointment meet
the independence criteria set in the Code. A chief
executive should not go on to be chairman of the
same company. …
4.2.4S2 The figures [of the compensation of the
members of the Management Board] shall be
[reported] individualized [in the Annual Report].
A.3.2 Except for smaller companies, at least half
the board, excluding the chairman, should
comprise non-executive directors determined by
the board to be independent. …
5.3.1 […] the Supervisory Board shall form
committees with sufficient expertise.
A.3.3 The board should appoint one independent
non-executive director to be the senior
independent director. The senior independent
director should be available to shareholders ….
5.3.2S1 The Supervisory Board shall set up an
Audit Committee […]
A.4.1 There should be a nomination committee
which should lead the process for board
appointments and make recommendations to the
board. A majority … should be independent. …
5.4.1S2 The international activities of the
enterprise, potential conflicts of interest and an
age limit to be specified for the members of the
Supervisory Board shall be taken into account.
A.6.1 The board should state in the annual report
how performance evaluation of the board, its
committees and its individual directors has been
conducted. …
5.4.7Para2S1 Members of the Supervisory Board
shall receive fixed as well as performance-related
compensation.
B.2.1 The board should establish a remuneration
committee of at least three … independent non-
executive directors. In addition the company
chairman may also be a member, but not chair…
5.4.7Para3S1 The compensation of the members
of the Supervisory Board shall be reported
individually in the Corporate Governance Report,
subdivided according to components.
C.3.1 The board should establish an audit
committee of at least three, or in the case of
smaller companies two, members, who should all
be independent non-executive directors. …
7.1.2S3(1.HS) The Consolidated Financial
Statements shall be publicly accessible within
90 days of the end of the financial year;
D.1.1 The chairman should ensure that the views of
shareholders are communicated to the board as a
whole. The chairman should discuss governance
and strategy with major shareholders. …
7.1.2S3 (2.HS) Interim reports shall be publicly
accessible within 45 days of the end of the
reporting period.
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While it can be argued that these figures demonstrate and confirm that comply-
or-explain offers regulatees a flexible form of regulation that avoids one size fits all,
alone they say nothing about the extent to which the deviations observed are
‘justifiable’ and consistent with the intentions of the code designers. They may just
be an expression of the companies’ unwillingness to comply (MacNeil and Li 2006:
488). In order to address this it is not sufficient to merely analyse compliance rates.
Rather one needs to examine the contents of the compliance statements, which we
turn to in the following section.
4.2 Forms of ‘‘explanation’’
Our analysis of the different compliance statements and governance reports revealed
considerable differences in the types of explanations that companies provide. In
addition to a very few cases where the statements were either ambiguous or
incomplete we identified three general categories of explanations, each with several
subcategories (see Table 6; see also Table 10 in the Appendix for a list of
exemplary ‘‘explanations’’ in each sub-category).
4.2.1 Deficient justification
The first category of explanation we term ‘‘deficient justification’’—where
companies confirm they have not complied with a code provision but do not
provide reasons for deviating. Such deviations may be either temporary or persist
over time. We identify three sub-categories: (a) pure disclosure, (b) description of
alternative practice and (c) empty justification. In the case of pure disclosure,
companies merely declare that they are deviating from particular code provisions.
For example, Grammer AG simply declares: ‘‘The Grammer AG has a Directors &
Officers Liability Insurance (‘‘D&O Insurance’’) for the Supervisory Board
Members, Executive Board Members and Managing Directors, but the insurance
does not contain a deductible [as code provision 3.8 requires]’’ (our translation).
Such pure-disclosure statements may indicate that the failure to comply is
temporary. Gerry Weber AG, for example, states: ‘‘The consolidated financial report
was available within 120 days of the end of the financial year. We are working on
meeting the deadline of 90 days [as required by code provision 7.1.2 S3 (1HS)] in
the future’’ (our translation). Description of alternative practice refers to statements
where the company does not comply with the requirement in the code but has acted
in a way that it addresses the underlying principle. While this kind of statement
provides more information than pure disclosure no reasons are given for choosing
an alternative solution. The codes are, after all, supposed to reflect best practice.
Adidas-Salomon AG, for example, states: ‘‘The structure and level of the Executive
Board compensation is reviewed and determined by the Supervisory Board’s
General Committee instead of the entire Supervisory Board [as required by code
provision 4.2.2 Para 1 (1HS)]. The General Committee informs the Supervisory
Board as a whole on the respective results.’’ The final ‘‘deficient’’ subcategory we
label empty justifications, where the explanation has (almost) no explanatory power.
Hornbach Holding AG, for example, writes: ‘‘Since we believe that the
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Table 6 Taxonomy of explanations
Categories of explanation Sub-categories of
explanation
Definition
Deficient justification
Company discloses deviation
without providing reasons for the
deviation
Pure disclosure
(temporary/
persistent)
Company only declares that it deviates
from the code provision. No
explanation is given. There are two
forms of this: (a) the company
indicates that the deviation is
temporary or (b) it does not.
Description of
alternative practice
Company presents an alternative
solution to the governance problem
that the code provision addresses but
does not provide any justification for
having chosen the stated solution.
There are two forms of this: (a) the
company indicates that the deviation
is temporary or (b) it does not.
Empty justification Company provides an explanation that
seems like a justification for its
deviation but which does not possess
any explanatory power.
Context-specific justification
Company justifies deviation with
reference to its specific situation
Size of company or
board
Company justifies deviation with
regard to the (small) size of the
company or its board due to which
the application of the code provision
appears inappropriate or impossible.
Company structure
(temporary/
persistent)
Company justifies deviation by
regarding the code provision as
inappropriate or impossible to
implement given its specific company
structure.
International context of
company
Company justifies deviation with
regard to specific aspects of its
international operations which mean
the code provision is inappropriate or
impossible to implement.
Other company
specific reasons
(temporary/persistent)
Company justifies deviation with
regard to the particular situation of
the company, other than its size,
structure or in ternational con text
which the application of the code
provision appears inappropriate or
impossible to implement. There are
two forms of this: (a) the company
indicates that the deviation is
temporary or (b) it does not.
Industry specificities Company justifies deviation with
regard to the specificities of the
industry in which it is involved which
mean the code provision is
inappropriate or impossible to
implement.
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compensation of our Management Board is adequate we see no necessity in
disclosing the compensation of every individual member [as required by provision
4.2.4 S2]’’ (our translation). Another example is the statement by Fielmann AG:
‘‘The existing structure of compensation for the members of our Supervisory Board
is in accordance with their responsibilities and duties, hence we see no need for any
performance-related components [as required by provision 5.4.7 Para2 S1]’’ (our
translation). Although such statements may at first glance seem to contain a
rudimentary explanation they are in fact merely statements confirming failure to
comply and as such provide investors and other audiences with little more
information than those purely disclosing noncompliance. In terms of the comply-or-
explain principle all three of these sub-categories are problematic in that they do not
provide any rational justification for deviating from what is deemed to be ‘‘best
practice’’. In the UK such deficient justifications constitute a breach of the Listing
Rules of the London Stock Exchange which explicitly require companies to provide
explanations for their deviations (see also Akkermans et al. 2007: 1116, endnote 3
on the Dutch case). Yet, beyond such formal concerns deficient justifications
undermine the basic idea of comply-or-explain. As MacNeil and Li (2006: 488)
write: ‘‘without adequate explanation in the event of non-compliance there can be
no possibility of the market evaluating whether or not it is justified.’’
4.2.2 Context-specific justification
In contrast to the previous category this comprises explanations for noncompliance
that are fully justified, where compliance is either irrational or impossible. We
Table 6 continued
Categories of explanation Sub-categories of
explanation
Definition
Transitional
justification (new
code provision or
new entrant)
Company justifies deviation with
regard to either (a) the novelty of the
code provision or (b) the fact that the
company is a new entrant to the
particular stock exchange, as a
consequence of which an application
of the code has not been possible, yet.
Principled justification
Company justifies deviation with
reference to problems with the
specific code provision as such
Effectiveness/
efficiency
Company justifies deviation by
pointing out that an application of the
code provision will be sub-optimal
generally—not just for its own
operations
General
implementation
problems
Company justifies deviation by
pointing out some general problems
in implementing the code provision.
Conflicts with laws or
societal norms
Company justifies deviation by
pointing out that the code provision
conflicts with societal norms, values
or laws.
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found six sub-categories, relating to (a) company size; (b) company structure;
(c) international context; (d) other company specific reasons; (e) industry
specificities; and; (f) transitional issues. With regards size, small companies often
have smaller numbers of directors on the boards than their larger counterparts, with
obvious implications for the formation of subcommittees. Rational AG, for
example, writes: ‘‘Since the Supervisory Board of RATIONAL AG consists of only
three members the formation of committees for complex issues [as requested by
code provisions 5.3.1 und 5.3.2 S1], such as an audit committee, appears
inappropriate’’ (our translation). On company structure H&R WASAG AG argued
that ‘‘Due to the many subsidiaries that have to be included the annual consolidated
financial account for the year 2004 was only published at the beginning of May
2005 [cf. code provision 7.1.2 S3 (1HS)]’’ (our translation). International context
may be important where, for example, accepted best practice in a company’s key
overseas market differs from domestic practice as embodied in their national code
of governance. Stada AG, for example, states: ‘‘The D&O Liability Insurance,
which includes both the board members and senior management, does not contain a
deductible [as required by code provision 3.8] since this is unusual in other
countries’’ (our translation). In addition to that, there are many other company-
specific reasons, some completely unavoidable, for example where serving board
members become ill or even die, causing the board to become unbalanced in respect
of maintaining a majority of independent directors, perhaps requiring the CEO to
serve temporarily in a dual capacity as both CEO and chairman. Beyond the reasons
to do directly with the company, there are also industry-specific reasons. WCM AG,
for example, states: ‘‘At the moment, we do not plan to change the current
compensation system [to comply with code provision 5.4.7Para2 S1], since forms of
payment related to company performance are unusual in our particular competitive
environment’’ (our translation). Finally, there are what we have termed transitional
justifications where companies have not yet been able to comply with a particular
code provision because either the provision itself is new or the company (or at least
parts of it in the case of mergers and acquisitions) has only recently become subject
to the regulations of the particular stock exchange (‘‘new entrant’’). An example for
the former is the statement by Adidas-Salomon AG which explains that
notwithstanding code provision 4.2.3Para2 S4, setting out conditions for stock
option plans, ‘‘all stock options had already been issued before the code provision
was introduced in May 2003’’ (our translation). These are all formally consistent
with the original idea of comply-or-explain—the avoidance of one size fits all.
Companies should be allowed to take into account their own individual circum-
stances in complying with the principles set out in their respective codes, avoiding
being ‘‘corseted’’ by the code (Ringleb et al. 2004: 89; Financial Reporting Council
2006a, b: 5). Several of the reasons given above were anticipated when the codes
were designed. The Cadbury Committee (Cadbury 1992: 3.15), for example,
explicitly mentions size as a potential justification for deviating. Similarly, Baums
(2001a, b: 7), chair of the panel that set up the German Code Commission, gives
international context as a possible reason.
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4.2.3 Principled justification
In contrast to context-specific justifications, explanations that we categorize as
principled arise when a company contends that a provision does not reflect best
practice. There are three sub-categories: (a) effectiveness/efficiency issues; (b) gen-
eral implementation issues, and; (c) conflicts with other laws/norms. On effective-
ness/efficiency Fresenius AG contends that: ‘‘Disclosure of individual compensation
for each member of the Management Board, required by clause 4.2.4, sentence 2, in
our view limits the structuring of compensation in such a way as to distinguish
individual performance and responsibility.’’ Another example is the statement of
BWH Holding AG: ‘‘The Management and Supervisory Board think that a general
age limit for members of the supervisory board [as required by code provision 5.4.1
S2] is inappropriate. It limits the shareholders’ choice of candidates and does not
adequately consider the personal qualification and experience of individual
candidates’’ (our translation). General implementation issues are similar but rather
than objecting to the principle outlined these explanations stress that the provision
to which they refer is difficult to put into practice, for all companies, not just in their
case, which we would categorise as company-specific. Deutsche Beteiligungs AG,
for example, explains it deviates from the requirement for D&O Liability Insurance
to contain a deductible because a ‘‘standard regarding amount and composition of a
deductible has still not been developed’’ (our translation). Finally, there are those
explanations that justify the deviation by pointing out that the provision in question
conflicts with laws or social norms. Loewe AG, for example, justifies their departure
from certain disclosure requests with concerns about the invasion of personal
privacy: ‘‘In order to protect their privacy we will not disclose any information on
the compensation of the individual members of the executive board [as requested by
code provision 4.2.4 S.2]’’ (our translation). Similarly, EM TV AG EM TV AG
refers to legal concerns to justify its deviation: ‘‘The introduction of performance
related payment for members of the Supervisory Board [as requested by code
provision 3.3.10] is put on hold, since there are currently concerns regarding the
legality of performance related payments’’ (our translation). While these forms of
explanation may or may not provide acceptable justification for deviating they are
not the company-specific reasons envisaged when the codes were originally
formulated.
In fact, somewhat to our surprise, analysis of the relative frequency of occurrence
of types of explanations (see Table 7) reveals that just under one half of the
deviations in the UK, and less than a quarter of deviations in Germany, were
explained by context-specific reasons. Of those that are context specific the ‘‘other’’
category was most common in both countries where, for a whole host of reasons,
companies find compliance difficult if not impossible as a result of some singular
event, characteristic, or condition. This is followed in the UK by ‘‘transitional
justifications’’, which relate to mergers, demergers and overseas companies seeking
a listing on the LSE for the first time. In Germany ‘‘size of company or board’’ was
the second most frequent context-specific reason, almost all of which, as one would
expect, are to be found in Band C, i.e., companies in the small cap index. In Britain,
by contrast, there was not a single instance of this category, consistent with the
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larger relative market capitalisation of British companies. Industry-specific reasons,
which some actors expected to be much in evidence (e.g. Baums 2001a, b), were
only rarely cited. A few companies did refer to the specific characteristics of their
industry as a reason for deviating but such deviations were relatively unimportant.
The small number of explicit justifications drawing on industry specificities also
indicates that in this respect one size can indeed fit all.
Strikingly, a very large number of explanations (40% in the UK and well over
50% in Germany) fall into the category of ‘‘deficient justification’’. In both
countries, this applies more to the smaller companies surveyed. Pure disclosure,
where deviations were simply disclosed without any reason being given, accounts
for 15% of deviations in the UK and almost 40% in Germany, although a large part
of these were indicated as being of temporary nature. The disparity between the two
countries can be explained in part because at the time of the study German
companies were not formally obliged to provide explanations—it was merely
‘‘recommended’’. In both the UK and Germany almost 10% of the explanations
were what we referred to as ‘‘empty’’, where companies presented explanations
which merely appeared to be justifications but which did not possess any substantial
Table 7 Distribution of different types of explanation
Type of explanation Germany (%) UK (%)
I. Lack of justification 55.7 41.3
Company discloses deviation without providing reasons for the deviation
I.1 Pure disclosure (persistent) 28.3 4.3
I.1 Pure disclosure (temporary) 10.3 10.9
I.2 Description of alternative practice (persistent) 8.3 11.6
I.2 Description of alternative practice (temporary) 0.0 5.1
I.3 Empty justification 8.8 9.4
II. Context-specific justification 23.8 52.2
Company justifies deviation with reference to its specific situation
II.1 Size of company or board 6.0 0.0
II.2 Company structure (persistent) 3.6 3.6
II.2 Company structure (temporary) 0.3 0.0
II.3 International context of company 2.2 1.4
II.4 Other company specific reasons (persistent) 8.3 7.2
II.4 Other company specific reasons (temporary) 1.2 18.3
II.5 Industry specificities 0.5 1.4
II.6 Transitional justification (new code provision) 0.7 1.4
II.6 Transitional justification (new entrant) 0.2 13.0
III. Principled justification 19.7 6.5
Company justifies deviation with reference to problems with the specific code provision as such
III.1 Ineffectiveness/inefficiency of code provision 12.8 6.5
III.2 General implementation problems 0.5 0.0
III.3 Conflicts with laws or societal norms 6.4 0.0
IV. Ambiguous or incomplete information 0.9 0.0
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information value beyond indicating areas of deviation, with a further 15% in the
UK and 8% in Germany describing alternative practices without justifying why.
Whether companies offering such deficient explanations did not have any
convincing justification or simply did not consider their external audiences would
have any interest, we cannot say.
Our final core category, ‘‘principled justification’’ accounts for about 6% of UK
deviations and almost 20% in Germany, of which the most frequent instances
concerned the general effectiveness/efficiency of a code provision. A similar
proportion of code provisions were questioned in both countries in this way. In the
UK companies objected for reasons of general effectiveness/efficiency, to eight out
of the 48 provisions of the Combined Code while in Germany the comparative
figure for the Cromme Code was 15 out of 82. In addition to that, some German
companies had issues with how practically to implement two particular code
provisions. Finally, six per cent of the deviations of our German companies, relating
to some 10 provisions, were justified on the basis of potential conflicts with law or
social norms (Akkermans et al. (2007) and Hooghiemstra and van Ees (2011) report
similar types of principled justifications in their studies of the Dutch code). The
difference between the UK and Germany regarding types of principled justifications
may be explained partially by the fact that the German code (like the Dutch Code) is
still relatively new compared to the UK code. Issues around implementation of
individual provisions and their compatibility with statute law or wider societal
norms are more likely to arise under these circumstances. The longer a code and its
individual code provisions have been in place the more likely it is that that these
issues will have been resolved—e.g., through explicit guidance on implementation
or through adjustments of the code provisions.
If all the explanations had been context specific, that is to say peculiar to each
individual deviating company, there might be little more to say on the matter.
However, the way that companies seem to coalesce around a number of common
types of justification, (our core categories and sub-categories) suggests there is more
to investigate. We consider these, as aspects of companies’ legitimacy tactics in the
following section where we also examine the implications for comply-or-explain of
the way the principle has been used beyond the codes designers’ intentions—to
avoid an inflexible one-size-fits-all body of rules.
4.3 Second order analysis: ‘‘explanations’’ and their legitimacy tactics
Compliance statements are a key means by which companies seek approval for their
governance arrangements and hence preserve their overall legitimacy. The
explanations provided in the statements can be conceived as legitimacy tactics.
Different explanations refer to different points of reference as the basis of
justification for the chosen governance arrangements (see Table 8). The most
obvious and straightforward form of explanation is a simple declaration of
compliance with a particular code provision. As such provision is by definition held
to represent best practice legitimation is normally assured—provided the code itself
is deemed by wider audiences to be legitimate. This is the most elementary
legitimacy tactic—seeking approval by conforming to an institution (Oliver 1991;
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Suchman 1995). In the case of context-specific justifications, legitimacy is conferred
by the legitimacy of the comply-or-explain principle itself. Comply-or-explain
serves here as a kind of meta-institution that provides a means of claiming ‘‘a valid
exception to the sound rule’’ (Higgs 2003: 3). As we have already described, some
potential exceptions, such as ‘‘size’’, are even referred to within the codes and/or
related guidance. That is to say, companies are conforming to the institutionalized
notion at the heart of comply-or-explain—that companies should deviate where a
code provision is inappropriate for their particular context. Hence, the basis on
which companies seek approval for deviating is nonetheless compliant—noncom-
pliance is, in this case, compliant.
This is very different to the case of a principled justification. Principled
justifications—rejecting the code—were not envisaged in the original Cadbury
Report (1992). This is a rejection of the code or at least of one or more of its
provisions, typically on grounds of ‘‘general (rather than company specific)
effectiveness/efficiency’’ and/or ‘‘general implementation problems.’’ This is
consistent with what Suchman (1995) refers to as pragmatic legitimation where
legitimacy is preserved by appealing to the ‘‘self-interested calculations of an
organization’s most immediate audiences’’ (Suchman 1995: 578). The organization
calls for approval of their departures from the code with the claim that the code
provision conflicts with the audience’s self-interest. For example, BHW Holding
AG rejected the code provision requiring an age limit to be determined for members
of the supervisory board on the basis that this would limit the choice of suitable
Table 8 Legitimacy tactics associated with different types of explanation
Type of Explanation Legitimacy tactic employed Basis of legitimacy
claim
Compliance with provision Conformance with code provision as
primary institution
Code provision
(primary
institution)
Context-specific justification Claims exception from code provision
consistent with logic of comply-or-
explain
Comply-or-explain
principle (meta-
institution)
Principled justification:
Effectiveness/efficiency and general
implementation problems
Rejection of code provision as
conflicting with audiences’ interests
(‘‘pragmatic legitimacy’’)
‘‘Self-interest of
immediate
audience’’
Conflict with laws or social norms Rejection of code provision as
conflicting with higher institutions
(‘‘moral legitimacy’’)
Beyond the code
(other institution)
Deficient justification:
Pure disclosure and description of
alternative practice—temporary
Promises future compliance with code
provision
Code provision
(primary
institution)
Pure disclosure and description of
alternative practice—persistent and
empty justification
Ambiguous Ambiguous
Applying the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle 809
123
candidates for the board and thus be against the interests of shareholders. A
somewhat similar legitimacy argument underlies those explanations we describe as
‘‘conflicting with societal norms and laws’’. Like the other two principled forms of
justification, this type of explanation also involves rejecting a code provision.
However, in this case it is a moral legitimacy argument (Suchman 1995).
Legitimacy is not obtained or preserved by consideration of the interests of a key
audience but simply by ‘‘judgments about whether the activity is the ‘right thing to
do’’’ (Suchman 1995: 579). Companies in effect appeal to a higher institution, for
example, laws or social norms that would be violated by compliance with the code
provision. Companies reject the provision by referring to some ‘‘higher’’ institutions
such as laws or other societal norms that seem to be violated by the provision. By
way of example, Loewe AG and Celesio AG both rejected the provision requiring
the disclosure of individual board member’s compensation as this, they argued,
would conflict with privacy norms or laws.
Finally, even within the deficient justification type of explanation one can find some
rudimentary legitimacy arguments employed. Those in the ‘‘temporary’’ sub-
categories of pure disclosure and description of alternative practice typically seek
approval for their practices by pointing to future compliance with the code provisions.
In the words of Suchman (1995: 590), they ‘‘promise reform, thereby segregating
today’s reality from tomorrow’s ideal’’. They are attempting to secure acceptance for
deviating from best practice by pointing to a future time when they will be in
compliance (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991). The basis for legitimacy here
though is not consistent with the original comply-or-explain concept. Although
describing an alternative practice they do not disclose any reason why they should be
treated exceptionally—merely they hold they should be considered legitimate as they
are moving towards compliance. In the case of empty justifications the legitimacy
tactic is merely mimetic. Companies deploying this argument purport to be providing
the same sort of explanation as those offering context specific or principled reasons yet
their explanations contain no real informational value and, at best, constitute a rather
rudimentary legitimacy argument. The two remaining ‘‘persistent’’ sub-categories of
pure disclosure and description of alternative practice do not contain any explicit
legitimacy arguments. They merely disclose the area of deviation and describe the
deviating arrangement. No attempt is made at specifying on what grounds the
legitimacy of these deviations is to be assessed—all that can be said is that the
company is open about its deviating governance arrangement.
5 Discussion
To recap, we set out to investigate the extent to which companies make use of the
‘‘explain’’ option and the bases by which companies claim legitimacy in the
explanations they provide for deviating. Our analysis of the compliance statements
and governance reports of the 257 companies we examined yielded three principal
findings. First, our quantitative analysis of the distribution of deviations across
different size bands and national contexts revealed that companies make consid-
erable use of the flexibility offered by the comply-or-explain principle. This is
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consistent with earlier studies of compliance rates (e.g. Von Werder et al. 2005; Von
Werder and Talaulicar 2006; Akkermans et al. 2007) but at odds with some (e.g.
Wymeersch 2005; Seidl 2007) concerned that companies would not be able to resist
the pressure to attain full compliance. Our present study differs from all these
previous studies in that we are concerned more to understand how companies use
the flexibility of comply-or-explain.
Second, our content analysis of the compliance statements led us to develop an
empirically derived taxonomy of types of explanation—deficient, context-specific,
principled and several important sub-categories—which reveal common ways in
which companies use the opportunity to explain deviations from code provisions. We
thus build upon and extend earlier work on modes of explanation, particularly
Akkermans et al. (2007), Arcot et al. (2010), Hooghiemstra and van Ees (2011),
MacNeil and Li (2006), and RiskMetrics Group (2009). While these studies raised
awareness of the importance of ‘‘explanations’’ they did not focus specifically on
explanation as a practice. MacNeil and Li (2006: 489) distinguish between
explanations that record deviations, those that provide proper justifications and those
that provide justifications of limited informational value. Arcot et al. (2010)
distinguish between disclosure with ‘‘no explanation’’, ‘‘general explanations’’ and
‘‘specific explanations’’ while both Akkermans et al. (2007) and Hooghiemstra and
van Ees (2011) report on a variety of different kinds of explanations but do not attempt
to organise their categories. In a report to the European Community, RiskMetrics
Group (2009) examines frequency of explanations across Europe. Their categories
comprise ‘‘invalid explanations’’ (just disclosing deviation), ‘‘general explanations’’,
‘‘limited explanations’’ (just describing the existing governance arrangement),
‘‘specific explanations’’ (explaining deviation on the basis of the situation of the
company) and ‘‘transitional explanations’’ (explanations referring to the temporary
nature of the deviation)—but our own taxonomy goes beyond this. The methodolog-
ical and analytical rigour employed in our research design enables us to take a more
robust and systematic approach to categorisation than these studies.
Third, in our second order analysis we identified the institutional bases and
legitimacy arguments made in respect of each type of explanation (Table 8). The
institutional bases were: (1) the code as the primary institution—for compliance and
‘‘temporary’’ deviations; (2) the comply-or-explain principle as a meta-institution—
for context-specific justifications, and; (3) external higher order institutions such as
laws and societal norms or considerations of the immediate audience’s self-
interest—for principled justifications. In theoretical respects this differentiation
offers important insights. It provides a basis for evaluating the challenges and
prospects of different legitimacy claims and for developing an appropriate
regulatory response to those legitimacy claims, as we show in the following section.
Analysing the structure of the various legitimacy claims provides us with
conceptual tools with which to evaluate the efficacy of different explanations. For
instance, claims that are based directly on the code provisions such as straightforward
compliance are very likely to be accepted by an external audience—irrespective of
their real value—due to the institutionalized belief about the provisions constituting
‘‘best practice’’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Enrione
et al. 2006; Hooghiemstra and van Ees 2011). Of course this presupposes the external
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audience believes there to be equivalence between the statement of compliance and the
actual governance arrangement. Where the legitimacy claim rests on the comply-or-
explain principle (particularly in the case of context-specific justifications), the
challenge to get approval is somewhat greater, since the audience needs to be
convinced that the specific context is indeed a reason for deviating. This can prove
challenging as the company and its audience may evaluate the context differently
(MacNeil and Li 2006: 487; Seidl 2007). While the audience in principle is likely to
approve exceptions to the provisions—to the extent that comply-or-explain is
institutionalized—the question is whether the specified context is seen as constituting
a valid exception. Where the legitimacy claim implies a rejection of code provisions
(i.e., principled justifications) the challenge to get approval is even higher as this
constitutes an attempt to modify prevailing cognitive frames about ‘‘best practice’’
(Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995) and the basis for legitimation is external to the code. To
succeed, external bases for legitimacy need to be very convincing, by pointing perhaps
to significant conflicts with the audience’s self-interests or to other institutions, such as
law. Gaining approval becomes increasingly doubtful as one moves from compliance
on the one hand, to deficient explanations on the other. In line with this, Hooghiemstra
and van Ees (2011) in their study on the Dutch code argue that this uncertainty about
the stakeholders’ approval for deviations leads companies to imitate each others’
compliance behaviours, in the sense that they tend to deviate in similar areas and with
similar forms of explanation.
Given these challenges one might expect companies would choose only those
legitimacy tactics likely to lead to success. Accordingly, one might expect to find almost
no deficient justifications, a few rather obvious context-specific justifications, and one or
two principled justifications where a strong argument can be made about conflicting
imperatives. Yet, this argument is neither in line with the empirical figures presented
here and elsewhere (MacNeil and Li 2006; Akkermans et al. 2007; RiskMetrics Group
2009; Hooghiemstra and van Ees 2011) nor with legitimacy theory as it overestimates
the importance of gaining approval for a company’s governance arrangements. As
legitimacy theory emphasizes, the legitimacy of an organization does not rest on
approval of a single act but on an overall assessment of its operations and structure. As
Suchman (1995: 574) points out, legitimacy represents an ‘‘umbrella evaluation that, to
some extent, transcends specific adverse acts or occurrences; […] An organization may
occasionally depart from societal norms yet retain legitimacy because departures are
dismissed as unique.’’ Hence, to the extent that an organization is otherwise largely in
conformance with institutionalized expectations, approval for individual governance
arrangements is not crucial. Again, this is consistent with findings by MacNeil and Li
(2006) that compliance with the code tends to rise in those cases where overall approval
of the company’s actions is in danger of being withdrawn.
Clearly, if the institutional basis of legitimacy has implications for managing the
process of legitimation it also has implications for managing the entire regime. In
the original self-regulatory design of the code regime emphasis is placed on the
interaction between companies and their immediate audience, the shareholders:
Companies provide their explanations which are used as the basis for approval or
disapproval of the company’s governance practices by key audiences and, where
necessary, sanctions are applied (Seidl 2007). However, the legitimacy arguments
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deployed and institutional bases we identify point to several limitations, both
conceptual and practical, of this basic self-regulatory model. The original model
was conceived with two forms of compliance in mind: compliance and context-
specific exceptions. Both of these are self-referential. They refer back on the code
itself as legitimising organizational action.
Principled justifications have very different implications for code regimes
compared to context-specific deviations or compliance. The former constitute
rejection of the code provision itself. They do this by seeking legitimacy with
reference to external institutions such as norms and laws or to the audience’s self-
interest—which are beyond the code. Principled justifications, by questioning best
practice assumptions, will, if successful, lead to the deinstitutionalization of the
respective provision, weaken the regulatory power of the provision and perhaps the
entire code. So while ‘‘compliance’’ and ‘‘context-specific justifications’’ uphold the
code regime, principled justifications have the capacity to undermine it. Conse-
quently, when faced with large numbers of principled justifications to a code
provision the regulator has to act—one way or another. Von Werder, one of the
architects of the German Cromme Code acknowledges that larger numbers of
principled objections should lead those responsible for the code to ‘‘review whether
the respective provisions make sense.’’ (Von Werder and Talaulicar 2006: 861, our
translation). This is especially likely to be the case in countries where codes or sets
of provisions are relatively new but even in the UK the Financial Reporting Council
regularly reviews the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined
Code), in part to assess and act on principled objections to code provisions. Such
reviews lead ultimately to one of three regulatory responses: (1) amend the code
provision; (2) improve enforcement, or; (3) provide guidance on implementation. In
cases based on ‘‘general effectiveness/efficiency’’ or ‘‘conflict with laws or social
norms’’ regulators can, if they accept the criticism, either amend the code provision
to accommodate concerns or if not improve enforcement by either focusing
regulatory resources on the problem using existing sanctions or by escalating up the
enforcement pyramid, for example, by moving from ‘‘enforced self-regulation’’—
voluntaristic code—to ‘‘command regulation with non/discretionary punishment’’—
statute law (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 38–39). Both responses could also be
observed subsequent to the observation period of our study. For example, the UK
Financial Reporting Council’s review of the code provisions in force for the year we
analysed for this study identified ‘‘potential changes for which there would appear to
be substantial support: [incl.] amending the existing provision relating to the
composition of remuneration committees to enable the chairman to sit on the
committee where he or she was considered independent on appointment’’ (Financial
Reporting Council 2006a, b). In Germany we could observe the second type of
response—escalation—when several code provisions were subsequently enshrined
in law (for an overview see Von Werder and Talaulicar 2010: 861). This included
the controversial provision requiring disclosure of individual compensation of board
members. In the case of ‘‘general implementation problems,’’ of which there have
been only a few examples, the response has been to provide additional guidance on
implementation of the sort provided in the official commentary on the Cromme code
[Kodex-Kommentar] (Ringleb et al. 2007).
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Finally, deficient justifications can also provoke a regulatory response as they
undermine the core principle of comply-or-explain, to ‘‘allow investors to make an
informed assessment of whether non-compliance is unjustified in the particular
situation’’ (MacNeil and Li 2006: 489). To the extent that information is not
provided or is inappropriate the organization’s immediate audience cannot fulfil
their monitoring function. Thus, deficient justifications undermine the functioning
of the self-regulatory code regime and will eventually require action by the
regulator. The most obvious response in this case would be to increase the level of
enforcement regarding the provision of information. Such a response occurred in the
period immediately following our study, when the German law (§161 stock
corporation act) requiring disclosure of deviations was amended to require
additionally that explanations be provided—a requirement that previously had
been part of the code, but not enshrined in law. In Table 9 we have summarized the
different regulatory responses to principled and deficient justifications.
6 Conclusion
This article has attempted to generate some new insights concerning the way that
the comply-or-explain principle, a central element of most corporate governance
code regimes, is being used by managers. With our empirically derived taxonomy of
‘‘explanations’’ and the description of the different discursive legitimacy tactics
deployed, we offer conceptual tools to aid understanding of the critical role of
comply-or-explain in corporate governance regimes. As we discuss, analysing
legitimacy tactics on the one hand provides a means for assessing the particular
challenges that companies face in securing approval for their activities while on the
other it helps identify the consequences of different forms of explanation for the
regulatory regime. As such our results have practical implications both for
managers—the use of explanations as legitimacy tactics—and regulators—by
addressing the implications for regulatory regimes of different types of explanation.
Table 9 Regulatory responses to forms of compliance statement
Type of explanation Response by regulator
Compliance with provision No action required (unless in doubt about the equivalence
between the statement of compliance and actual governance
arrangements)
Context-specific justification No action required
Principled justification
General effectiveness/efficiency and
conflict with laws and norms
Alternative responses: Change of code provision or increasing
level of enforcement
General implementation problems Provision of additional guidance
Deficient justification Increasing level of enforcement regarding practice of
explanation
814 D. Seidl et al.
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We also contribute to three literatures. First, within the corporate governance
literature we build upon earlier studies of corporate governance codes. In particular
we add to that literature an empirically robust taxonomy of the types of explanation
found in corporate governance compliance statements and provide new insights into
the way these affect the corporate governance regime. Second, we contribute to the
literature on soft regulation and self-regulation by providing new insights into the
dynamics of code regimes as a particular type of enforced self-regulatory regime.
Finally, with our analysis of the discursive legitimacy tactics deployed in
compliance statements we contribute to legitimacy theory by adding to those
studies that have analyzed legitimacy tactics in other contexts (e.g. Vaara et al.
2006; Elsbach 1994).
Like all such studies our work also has limitations which can serve as an agenda
for future research. First, given the exploratory nature of our research questions, we
limited our study to two countries (albeit countries with contrasting capital market
structures, legal cultures and different experiences of governance codes). So while
we are confident of the robustness of our taxonomy in respect of Germany and the
UK we cannot say for sure there are no further forms of compliance or explanation
to be found in other national contexts. In particular further research in developing
countries could prove to be of interest. Second, we focussed on generating our
taxonomy of explanations and analysing the discursive legitimacy tactics deployed.
Quantitative analysis of the distribution of different types of explanations by sector,
size and domain was used only as a means of corroborating our taxonomy. Future
studies could examine in more detail the reasons for differences in frequency of the
types of explanation we educed. For example, drawing on Hooghiemstra and van
Ees (2011) one would expect that the ‘‘visibility’’ of the company has an influence
on the choice of explanations and the respective legitimacy strategies. Third, our
study was cross-sectional—a snapshot based on a single period of compliance
statements—even though to an extent we took account of subsequent regulatory
reactions. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the wider self-
regulatory code regime we would encourage longitudinal studies to be carried out to
capture the responses of regulators and companies to the actions of each over time.
Finally, our study focussed on compliance statements and the respective legitimacy
tactics they represent. Further studies could look into the correspondence between
compliance statements and actual governance arrangements within corporations. If
such studies find that compliance statements are decoupled from actual governance
arrangements (cf. Akkermans et al. 2007: 1115) there may be a need for additional
governance mechanisms to be developed and deployed.
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